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F ROM the time of Aristotle and Plato philosophers have debated
whether a person should be permitted to dictate without restric-
tion the disposition of his property after death, and thus by his un-
restricted fancy and caprice have the ability to pass his property to
strangers while making paupers of his children, parents or wife and
casting their support upon the state.' As a corollary to the above:
can a testator include a condition, seeking to insure that his wishes
and directions will be carried out without question or litigation,
that the gift will be forfeited in case the beneficiary should dispute
or contest the will?
Thus, just as philosophers have debated the right of the testator
to devise his property without restriction, so the courts and text
writers have sharply differed as to whether a condition seeking to
insure the performance of the testator's directions should be enforced
at all, or to a limited extent.'
Gifts or bequests made on condition that there be no contest or
litigation in regard thereto have been termed "in terrorem" provisions.
The doctrine of in terrorem is based upon the view that the method
will bring pressure on beneficiaries to comply with the conditions.
As pointed out in one text: "the Rule 'in terrorem' was derived
from the civil law and is that a condition subsequent which is against
public policy, public decency or good manners, will be treated as
in terrorem unless there is a specific devise over. In adopting it the
English and American Courts have stricken that part relating to
good manners. '
Although the term "in terrorem" is used rather generally, it more
correctly should be applied where the provision is regarded as literally
in terrorem, in the sense that it is used merely to intimidate and
coerce the beneficiary and therefore is not enforceable; the provision
A.B., LL.B., University of Texas; Research Fellow, Southwestern Legal Foundation.
'1 Page, Wills § 1.7, at 26 (1960).
Browder, Testamentary Conditions Against Contest, 36 Mich. L. Rev. 1066 (1938);
Brown, Provisions Forbidding Attack in a Will, 4 Tul. L. Rev. 421 (1930); Keegan, Pro-
vision in Will Forfeiting Share of Contesting Beneficiary, 12 A.B.A.J. 236 (1926); Parks,
Provisions in a Will Forfeiting the Share of a Contesting Beneficiary, 3 Wash. L. Rev. 45
(1928). Comment, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 762 (1957); Note, 6 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 195 (1929);
Note, 23 Colum. L. Rev. 169 (1923); Note, 7 Va. L. Rev. 64 (1920).
' 96 C.J.S., Wills § 992 n. 59 (1957).
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may under certain circumstances, however, be considered a proper
condition subsequent to carry out the wishes of the testator and
would be, therefore, enforceable. It is more accurate in discussing
this subject to use the term "non-contest" or "no-contest" provisions
or clauses rather than simply "in terrorem" clauses.
Generally speaking, a no-contest provision in a will or trust instru-
ment is a stipulation that in the event of contest or other opposition
the contesting beneficiary shall forfeit his legacy or share and shall
receive nothing or only a reduced amount (generally a nominal
sum). The term thus includes stipulations against disputing, inter-
rupting, litigating or otherwise opposing the carrying out of the
will or trust instrument or any of its provisions, as well as clauses
specifically forbidding any contest or litigation.
Some of the usual situations in which the draftsman of a will or
trust instrument may consider the inclusion of a no-contest provision
as being desirable are these: where there already exists a family contro-
versy and differences between members of the family; where there
is an unequal disposition of property as between members of the
family; where bequests are made to others than the natural objects
of the testator's or grantor's bounty; where the state of health or
mental capacity of the grantor or testator may give a basis for a
claim of lack of testamentary capacity or of undue influence; and
where there are circumstances indicating that the grantor or testator
would desire to preclude a public examination of his mannerisms,
idiosyncrasies or other inquiry into his private affairs.
No-CONTEST CLAUSE GENERALLY VALID
Generally, the no-contest clause has been held to be valid and not
against public policy.' The leading English case is Cooke v. Turner!
The testator, after giving his daughter certain benefits out of his
real estate, revoked them and gave the estates over in case his daugh-
ter should dispute his will or his competency to make it, or should
refuse to confirm it when required to do so by his executors. The
daughter refused to confirm the will, and, a suit having been insti-
tuted to establish it, she disputed its validity and the competency of
her father. The court held that the clause of revocation was valid,
the gift over took effect, and the benefits given by the will to the
daughter were forfeited by her actions. The court stated:
There is no duty on the part of an heir, whether of perfect or im-
'See cases cited in 5 Page, Wills S 44.39 n. 2 (1962).
' 15 M. & W. 727, 14 Sim. 493 (1846).
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perfect obligation, to contest his ancestor's sanity. It matters not to
the state whether the land is enjoyed by the heir or the devisee, and we
conceive, therefore, that the law leaves the parties to make just what
contracts and what arrangements they may think expedient, as to the
raising or not raising questions of law or fact among one another, the
sole result of which is to give the enjoyment of property to one claimant
rather than another. The question, whether this proviso is a proviso
void as being contrary to the policy of the law, may be well tested by
considering how the case would have stood, if, instead of a condition
subsequent, it had been made, as in substance it might have been made,
a condition precedent.'
In 1897 the Supreme Court of the United States decided Smith-
sonian Institution v. Meech.7 The testator had devised certain real
estate to the institution, although title was vested in his wife, the
will declaring: "These bequests are all made upon the condition that
the legatees acquiesce in this will, and I hereby bequeath the share
or shares of any disputing this will to the residuary legatee hereinafter
named."8 Certain legatees claimed title under the wife, contrary to
the provisions of the will. The Court reviewed the prior decisions in
which the provisions of the will were considered as not obligatory
but only in terrorem. Other decisions were also discussed in which
the acquiescence of the legatee appeared to have been a prerequisite
to the gift, which was made to terminate upon the legatee's con-
troverting the will or any of its provisions. In such case the legacy
was given over to another person, with the restriction no longer con-
tinuing as a condition in terrorem, but assuming the character of a
conditional limitation. The legatees insisted that the devise of this
particular real estate to the plaintiff should not stand; that it was
not the property of the testator, and could not lawfully be devised by
him; and, therefore, that the plaintiff should not take the property
which the testator proposed to give the institution. The Court stated:'
"From the earliest case on the subject, the rule is, that a man shall
not take a benefit under the will, and at the same time defeat the
provisions of the instrument. If he claims an interest under an instru-
ment, he must give full effect to it, so far as he is able to do so."'"
Justice Brewer then summarized the Court's decision as follows:
The propositions . . . fully commend themselves to our approval.
They are good law and good morals. Experience has shown that often
' 15 M. & W. at 735-36.
7 169 U.S. 398 (1897).
S Id. at 399.
8The court cited Beall and McElfresh Adm'rs v. Schley, 2 Gill 181, 200, 41 Am. Dec.
415, 418 (1844).
"
0 Smithsonian Institution v. Meech, 169 U.S. 398, 415 (1897).
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after the death of a testator unexpected difficulties arise, technical rules
of law are found to have been trespassed upon, contests are commenced
wherein not infrequently are brought to light matters of private life
that ought never to be made public, and in respect to which the voice
of the testator cannot be heard either in explanation or denial, and as
a result the manifest intention of the testator is thwarted. It is not
strange, in view of this, that testators have desired to secure compliance
with their dispositions of property and have sought to incorporate pro-
visions which should operate most powerfully to accomplish that result.
And when a testator declares in his will that his several bequests are
made upon the condition that the legatees acquiesce in the provisions of
his will, the courts wisely hold that no legatee shall without compliance
with that condition receive his bounty, or be put in a position to use
it in the effort to thwart his expressed purposes."'
Generally, the condition against contesting the will has been held
to be valid and enforceable where there is a gift over in the event of
breach." Where there is no gift over of the property upon a breach
of the conditions, however, the authorities are not harmonious as
to whether the condition is valid. The English courts hold that the
condition is valid as to devises of land but that it is invalid in bequests
of personalty, the condition being in such cases mere in terrorem.5
Some courts in the United States follow the English rule just
mentioned, making a distinction as to devises of realty and bequests
of personalty.' In most jurisdictions, however, the validity of the
condition has been assumed whether there is a gift over or not, and
whether the property is realty or personalty. 5 As stated by the
Supreme Court of Michigan in Schiffer v. Brenton,"6 "We hold un-
equivocally that provisions of the character of the one before us
are valid and enforceable, that they apply both to devises of real
estate and bequests of personal property . . . irrespective of the good
or bad faith of the contest. '"
Thus there is the view, as pointed out in the authorities above,
11 Ibid.
"See cases cited in 5 Page, Wills § 44.29 n. 3 (1962).
" Fifield v. Van Wyck's Exr., 94 Va. 557, 27 S.E. 446 (1897). The court stated that
the in terrorem doctrine, "although not based upon any satisfactory reason, was firmly
fixed in the law of England at an early day." Supra at 448.
As to bequests of land, Cooke v. Turner, 15 M. & W. 727 (1946); Adams v. Adams,
1 Chan. 369 (1874); and as to personalty, Morris v. Burroughs, 1 Atk. 399 (1737).
14 As to realty, Barry v. American Security & Trust Co., 135 F.2d 470 (D.C. Cir. 1943);
Bradford v. Bradford, 19 Ohio St. 546, 2 Am. Re. 419 (1869); and as to personalty:
Fifield v. Van Wyck's Exr., 94 Va. 557, 27 S.E. 446 (1897); In re Arrowsmith, 162 App.
Div. 623, 147 N.Y.S. 1016 (1914).
"Smithsonian Institution v. Meech, 169 U.S. 398 (1898); In re Cocklin's Estate, 236
Iowa 98, 17 N.W.2d 129 (1945); and Annots., 5 A.L.R. 1370 (1920), 14 A.L.R. 609
(1921), 26 A.L.R. 764 (1922), and 49 A.L.R.2d 174, 198 (1927); see cases cited 5 Page,
Wills § 44.29 n. 7 (1962).
'0247 Mich. 512, 266 N.W. 253 (1929).7 1d. at 255.
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that the testator may leave his property to any one he chooses and
is at liberty to exclude from his bounty those beneficiaries who un-
successfully seek to thwart his testamentary wishes, and that there
is no duty or right on the part of an heir or legatee to contest or
object to the enforcement of testator's wishes.
CONTEST IN GOOD FAITH AND WITH PROBABLE CAUSE
The enforcement of the condition against contest has been criti-
cized by text writers as being against public policy and as offering
an effective means of terrorizing the heirs and next of kin who are
given any substantial benefits under the will, thus preventing them
from contesting the will in cases of fraud, undue influence and the
like. Accordingly, a number of courts, on the ground of public
policy and with reluctance to declare forfeiture, sharply limit the
enforcement of the condition as to contest by specifying that for-
feiture will not be decreed where the contest was made in good faith
and upon probable cause, the reason being that the testator is assumed
to have included such intention in connection with the condition.18
Many courts have refused to enforce a forfeiture where the con-
test was deemed to have been made in good faith and on probable
grounds under the particular circumstances involved.'
The reasons for refusing forfeiture where good faith and probable
cause exist are stated by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in South
Norwalk Trust Co. v. St. John: °
The exception that a contest for which there is a reasonable ground
will not work a forfeiture, stands upon better ground. It is quite
likely true that the authorities to greater number refuse to accept this
exception, but we think it has behind it the better reason. It rests upon
sound policy. The law prescribes who may make a will and how it shall
be made; that it must be executed in a named mode, by a person having
testamentary capacity and acting freely, and not under undue influence.
The law is vitally interested in having property transmitted by law
under these conditions, and none others.
Courts cannot know whether a will, good on its face, was made in
conformity to statutory requirements, whether the testator was of sound
'SNote, 22 Texas L. Rev. 361 (1944).
" Barry v. American Security & Trust Co., 135 F.2d 470 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Wells v.
Menn, 158 Fla. 228, 28 S.2d 881 (1946); Rudd v. Searles, 262 Mass. 490, 160 N.E. 882
(1928); Ryan v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 235 N.C. 585, 70 S.E.2d 853 (1952); White-
hurst v. Gotwalt, 189 N.C. 577, 127 S.E. 582 (1925); Wadsworth v. Brigham, 125 Ore.
428, 259 P. 299 (1927), opinion rehearing, 125 Ore. 458, 266 P. 875 (1928); Tate v.
Camp, 147 Tenn. 137, 245 S.W. 839 (1922); In re Friend's Estate, 209 Pa. 442, 58 A. 853
(1904); In re Cocklin's Estate, 236 Iowa 98, 17 N.W.2d 129 (1945). See also Annots., 42
A.L.R. 847 and 42 A.L.R. 1555.
20 92 Conn. 168, 101 A. 961 (1917).
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mind, and whether the will was the product of undue influence, unless
those matters are presented in court; and those only who have an in-
terest in the will will have the disposition to lay the facts before the
court. If they are forced to remain silent, upon penalty of forfeiture
of a legacy or devise given them by the will, the court will be prevented
by the command of the testator from ascertaining the truth; and the
devolution of property will be had in a manner against both statutory
and common law.21
There are cases from many other jurisdictions in which the courts
did not enforce forfeiture of the no-contest provision where the con-
test or opposition was made in good faith and upon probable cause
(probabilis causa litigandi) and was justifiable under all of the cir-
cumstances .This exception is based on the view that the provision
was not intended by the testator to include a contest on such ground,
or because the court considers that a forfeiture in such case would be
contrary to public policy. The courts differ as to whether the "weight
of authority" is in favor of or against the observance of this excep-
tion.2
In a number of cases enforcement of forfeiture has been decreed
even though the contest had been instituted in good faith and with
probable cause. In Barry v. American Security and Trust Companyu
a will containing a no-contest clause was contested by Barry, a bene-
ficiary. Circuit Judge Parker concluded that the beneficiary thereby
forfeited his legacy
irrespective of the question of good faith or probable cause for the
litigation .... The view that the wishes of the testator should be dis-
regarded with respect to the disposition of his property in the interest
of greater freedom of litigation does not impress us as resting on a
sound or logical basis.... The public interest in freeing such contests
1 101 A. at 963.
2 The summary of the law, as set forth in Restatement, Property, seems to support
the allowance of will contests where there exists good faith and probable cause. Section
431 states:
Except as stated in §§ 428 and 430, an otherwise effective condition precedent,
special limitation, condition subsequent or executory limitation which is de-
signed to prevent the acquisition or retention of a devised interest in land or
in things other than land, in the event of any proceeding against the estate
or interference with the management thereof is valid, except where the de-
visee acts with probable cause or succeeds with his proceedings against the
estate, in which case the restraint is invalid. (Emphasis added.)
These principles are explained in illustration number 2 under this section:
A, owning Blackacre in fee simple absolute, makes an otherwise effective
devise of the income thereof "to B for life, remainder to C and his heirs.
It is my will that if any of my devisees shall interfere with my executors in
the management of my estate, then and in that event, the share which such
devisee would have taken is to be given to D." B, with probable cause, sues the
executors alleging waste and mismanagement of Blackacre. The condition is
invalid. B does not lose his estate for life.
23 1 3 5 F.2d 470 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
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from the restraining influence of conditions like that here involved
seems of little importance compared with enforcing the will of the
testator that those who share in his bounty shall not have been guilty
of besmirching his reputation or parading the family skeletons after
his death. 4
In Rossi v. Davis"5 the Supreme Court of Missouri held that good
faith and probable cause would not excuse a forfeiture under the no-
contest provision in a trust instrument. "To engraft upon the condi-
tion thus distinctly expressed by the maker an exception not expressed
nor reasonably implicable from the language of the instrument is
to nullify the will of the maker, if in fact it be his will."" The court
reasons that the no-contest clause does not preclude any beneficiary
from seeking redress in the courts, but "every litigant takes and must
take the chance to win or lose in a lawsuit.
7
To similar effect is the holding of the Supreme Court of California
in In re Miller,8 where the court stated that to allow an exception
based on probable cause for the contest would "substitute our own
views for a clearly expressed intent of the testator to the con-
trary. . . . It is a mere attempt at an artificial distinction to avoid
the force of a plain and unambiguous condition against contests.
2
1
The Supreme Court of Michigan has similarly held in Scbiffer v.
Brenton8 and other cases.
In a number of other states, including Texas, it is uncertain which
line of decisions the courts will follow. There are two cases by the
Texarkana Court of Civil Appeals, Massie v. Massie'1 and Perry v.
Rogers,2 in which the court decreed absolute forfeiture without re-
ferring to the matter of good faith and probable cause. In the Massie
case the testator, treating land as his separate property, devised it
equally to his children and provided that any child contesting the
will should forfeit his right thereunder. The court held that where a
child contested the will on the ground that testator had disposed
of property belonging to his deceased mother, the child elected to
recover as an heir of his mother and forfeited his right under the
will. In the Perry case the facts are somewhat complicated. The will
provided that "if at any time any beneficiary should attempt or
2
4 id. at 471, 473.
21133 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1939).2 1Id. at 372.
17 Ibid.
21156 Cal. 119, 103 P. 842 (1909).2 9 Id. at 843, 844.
3o247 Mich. 512, 226 N.W. 253 (1929).
5' 118 S.W. 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909).
32 114 S.W. 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908).
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should proceed in changing or breaking my aforesaid will, then it is
my wish and desire that the half interest that I hold and possess in
all my estate, both real and personal, be given and I hereby bequeath
the same to my present wife for the benefit of my sons . . of my
present wife by me."3 Suit was brought by children of the first
marriage against other children of that marriage and the surviving
wife and children of the third and fourth marriages for partition of
the land devised. The court decreed that forfeiture would be en-
forced even as against a son of the third wife who did not initiate
the action nor join in the attack on the will, stating:
That it was his intention that his surviving wife and their children
should take his interest in the property to the exclusion of every other
person, in the event the disposition made by him of the property
should not be effective because not acquiesced in by one entitled to
object thereto, we think was made as clear as language could evidence
it. . . . The intention being plain, that to give it effect will operate
to deprive devisees, innocent of any attack on his right to dispose of
the property of the benefit it conferred upon them furnishes no reason
why his will should not be enforced as he intended it should be."
In subsequent cases Texas courts have stated, at least as dicta, that
forfeiture will not be decreed if good faith and probable cause for
the contest exist. In Calvery v. Calvery" the action was to construe
a will as to whether the legatee was vested with a life estate or fee
simple. In the opinion by the commissioner of appeals it is stated:
"The great weight of authority sustains the rule that a forfeiture of
rights under the terms of a will will not be enforced where the con-
test of the will was made in good faith and upon probable cause....
Our supreme court has never passed upon this precise question, and
the view we take of this record renders a decision thereon in this
cause unnecessary."' The court held that the suit was to construe the
will, not to contest it: "We do not intend to declare whether a for-
feiture would result from a suit merely to ascertain the intent of a
testator, regardless of the contestant's good faith and regardless of
the existence of probable cause for the institution of the suit. No
such case is before us." '
The Dallas Court of Civil Appeals, in 1937, considered the ques-
tion in First Methodist Episcopal Church South v. Anderson,"8 which
was a suit to construe the will. The court stated that forfeiture
33 Id. at 898.
341d. at 299.
" 122 Tex. 204, 55 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932).
31id. at 530.
37Id. at 530, 531.
"3 110 S.W.2d 1177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
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should not result when a contest is made in good faith and upon
probable cause, 9 but concluded that the suit was for the purpose of
"interpreting" the will rather than one "to thwart the will of the
testator."'
In Hodge v. Ellis" a suit to establish title to property was filed by
the husband grantee when the wife in her will purported to convey
the entire property as her separate property. The court concluded
that the suit was one brought in good faith and upon probable cause
(citing Calvery) to establish title and was not a suit to "thwart
the will" of the testator, but if the latter were the intention of the
suit, the forfeiture clause would be operative.
Thus this issue has not been decided in Texas. It remains for our
supreme court to decide whether "good faith and probable cause"
for the contest will avoid forfeiture or, on the contrary, afford no
excuse for a violation of the condition in the will.
WHAT CONSTITUTES A CONTEST?
What constitutes a contest or opposition to the will or trust instru-
ment violating the no-contest clause? The word "contest" as used
in the forfeiture provision of a will or trust agreement means any
legal proceeding which is designed to result in the thwarting of
testator's wishes as expressed in his will.4" The word "contest" is not
used in a technical sense, but means to make a subject of dispute,
to litigate, to oppose, challenge, resist. For example, objections to
probate of a will on the ground that its execution was obtained by
fraud, undue influence, lack of testamentary capacity, etc."3
The intention of the grantor controls, and whether there has been
a contest of the will must be determined by the circumstances of
each particular case. The particular wording of the no-contest clause
is important."
It is not necessary to attack the entire instrument; any attack that
will defeat the purpose of the testator as expressed in the will comes
within the forfeiture clause."5 It has even been held that a no-contest
3 1id. at 1184.
" Ibid.
41 268 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
41In re Hite's Estate, 155 Cal. 436, 101 P. 443 (1909); In re Howard's Estate, 63 Cal.
App. 2d 9, 155 P.2d 841 (1945); Hodge v. Ellis, 268 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
'Moran v. Moran, 144 Iowa 451, 123 N.W. 202 (1909); In re Cocklin, 236 Iowa 98,
17 N.W.2d 129 (1945). Annots., 5 A.L.R. 1370 (1920), 14 A.L.R. 609 (1921), 26
A.L.R. 764 (1922), 49 A.L.R.2d 174, 198 (1927).
4498 C.J.S., Wills § 1003, at 509 (1957); In re Cronin's Will, 257 N.Y.S. 496 (1932),
aff'd, 261 N.Y.S. 936 (1932); Hodge v. Ellis, 268 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
41Moran v. Moran, 144 Iowa 451, 123 N.W. 202 (1909).
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provision may operate against a devisee who did not take part in the
contest." It has also been held that the withdrawal of the contest,
once filed, does not prevent the application of the forfeiture." A
number of actions are uniformly held to constitute contests. An
attack on the mental capacity of the testator or grantor constitutes
a "contest" within the meaning of the usual clause, whether or not
the litigation assumes the traditional form of a will contest.4
The courts have decided in a number of cases that certain actions
do not constitute a "contest." The most frequent example is a suit for
construction of the will or trust instrument, where the object of he
suit is not to render the instrument void or to nullify any of its parts
but rather to ascertain its true legal meaning.49 Filing claims against
the estate,5" or claims of damages for breach of contract,51 are not con-
tests. An action asserting the court's lack of jurisdiction of the pro-
bate proceedings on the ground that the testator was domiciled else-
where has been held not to be a contest." Also an answer to a petition
for probate which only questions whether the will was executed in
accordance with the required statutory formalities is not a contest."
It has been held that an action against the executor for rents collected
on land devised to plaintiff did not constitute a contest where the
provision prohibited both direct and indirect contest of the will.
"An indirect contest connotes as a minimum some affirmative action
either by word or deed."' A proceeding to determine heirship has
been held not to be a contest, as it is not an attempt to thwart the
testator's wishes as expressed in the will."
Generally, an attack in good faith by a beneficiary on the ad-
ministration of the estate by the executors or others concerned in its
management does not constitute a contest or an attempt to defeat
the will within the meaning of the forfeiture clause therein. This, of
" Alper v. Alper, 142 N.J. Eq. 547, 60 A.2d 880 (1948), including minors, aff'd.
12 N.J. 105, 65 A.2d 737 (1949).4 7 in re Hite's Estate, 155 Cal. 436, 101 P. 443 (1909); In re Simpson's Estate, 196 A.
451 (Prerog. Ct. on N.J. 1938); 5 Page, Wills § 44.29, at 475 (1962).
4In re Hite's Estate, 155 Cal. 436, 101 P. 443 (1909); In re Cronin's Will, 143 Misc.
559, 257 N.Y.S. 496, aft'd, 261 N.Y.S. 936 (1932); Tate v. Camp, 147 Tenn. 137, 245 S.W.
839 (1922), and cases cited therein.
4'Tate v. Camp, ibid.; Calvery v. Calvery, 122 Tex. 204, 55 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1932); Hodge v. Ellis, 268 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); 5 Page, Wills §
44.29, at 473 (1962).
' Kolb v. Levy, 104 S.2d 225 (Fla. Civ. App. 1958); Wright v. Commins, 108 Kan.
667, 196 P. 246 (1921).
" Haley v. Pickelsimer, 261 N.C. 293, 134 S.E.2d 697 (1964).
" Estate of Crisler, 217 P.2d 470 (Cal. Civ. App. 1950); Maguire v. Bliss, 304 Mass. 12,
22 N.E.2d 615 (1939).
"Scriven v. Scriven, 153 Neb. 655, 45 N.W.2d 760 (1951).
4 Lavine v. Shapiro, 257 F.2d 14 (7th Cir. 1958).
"I1n re Spehar's Estate, 367 P.2d 563 (Mont. 1961).
196 5]
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course, will depend upon the particular wording of the no-contest
clause, which might include a prohibition of such actions." By main-
taining or participating in an action or suit for an accounting or
settlement of the estate, beneficiaries do not ordinarily violate pro-
visions in the will prohibiting a contest.
The bringing of a suit for partition of property devised in the will
has been held not to constitute a contest or attempt to defeat the
provisions of the will. In Bethurum v. Browder" it was held that a
devisee by filing a suit seeking partition in kind did not forfeit the
bequest, notwithstanding a provision in the will that the devisees
act in harmony with the executor, abide by the executor's decisions,
etc. This decision may be in partial conflict with Massie v. Massie."
No general rule can be stated as to whether a party claiming title
or an interest in the property independent of the will is thereby
contesting the will violating the no-contest provision. A determina-
tion depends upon the particular facts and circumstances in the light
of the provisions of the no-contest clause. In Massie v. Massie"° and
Perry v. Rogers"5 the Texarkana Court of Civil Appeals held that
the forfeiture resulted from an action of this nature. On the other
hand, in Hodge v. Ellis2 the court held that the husband, in filing
an action to recover his community interest which the wife sought
to bequeath under her will as her separate property was only to
ascertain title and did not violate the no-contest clause.
Appearing as or procuring a witness for the contestant does not
constitute a violation of the no-contest provision where there is
nothing to show that the beneficiary otherwise actively interested
himself in furthering the contest." However, there may be a violation
of the clause when the beneficiary furnishes money to or agrees to
reimburse the contestant."2 Merely expressing or indicating a wish that
the contestant be successful in the contest does not bring one within
the prohibition of the no-contest provision.6
" Upham v. Upham, 200 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); In re Lavin's Estate,
99 Cal. App. 586, 278 P. 925 (1929) error ref. n.r.e.; Chew's App. 45 Pa. 228 (1863);
Annot. 49 A.L.R.2d 174, 218 (1927).
5 Upham v. Upham, ibid.; Cohen v. Reisman, 48 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. 1948); and cases
cited in Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 174, 220 (1927).
58 216 S.W.2d 992 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.
5' 118 S.W. 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909).
6o Ibid.
61 114 S.W. 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908).
12268 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), aff'd in part and reversed in part on other
grounds, 154 Tex. 341, 277 S.W.2d 900 (1951).
"See also First Methodist Episcopal Church South v. Anderson, 110 S.W.2d 1177 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1937) error dismissed; and cases cited, Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 174, 223 (1927).
64 See Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 174, 231 (1927).
6 5 1d. at 232.
Id. at 234.
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ATTEMPT TO PROBATE A SUBSEQUENT WILL
An interesting question arises where a beneficiary under a will
containing a no-contest provision offers or assists in the offering for
probate of a subsequent will. No Texas case has been noted on this
particular question. The authorities passing upon the question in other
jurisdictions have made a distinction depending upon whether the
subsequent will is believed by the beneficiary to be genuine or is
known by him to be spurious.
Thus it is held that an attempt to probate a will which is spurious in
fact but believed to be genuine does not render the petitioner subject
to the forfeiture provisions of the no-contest clause of a prior will.
The reason for such holding is set forth by the Supreme Court of
California in Bergland: '
[I]t may be worthy of note that to hold that the testator intended
to forbid under penalty any attempt to probate what was genuinely
believed to be a later will would mean that he intended decidedly to
limit his own freedom of subsequent testamentary action. Such penalty
would seriously discourage any attempt to probate even a genuine later
will, and would distinctly lessen the chance of any later testamentary
expression by the testator being made effective. It is not to be pre-
sumed that he contemplated or intended any such consequence."
Likewise, the New York court held in the case of Kirkholder's
Estate9 that a legatee does not forfeit his legacy by presenting for
probate an alleged later will which is denied probate, provided he acts
in good faith with probable cause to believe that such later instru-
ment is genuine. The court said that if the testator did in fact make
such later will and the legatee had possession of it and had no reason
to doubt its genuineness and legality, it would be such legatee's duty
to offer it for probate, where such legatee is named in it as executor;
and it would be against public policy to subject him to a penalty or
forfeiture for doing what it was his duty to do.
On the other hand, an attempt by a beneficiary to probate a sub-
sequent will known by him to be false would come within the no-
contest clause of the prior will.7" It is submitted that the reasoning
in the above cases is sound. If from the facts and circumstances the
subsequent will appears to be genuine, the offering of it for probate
by a beneficiary does not violate the no-contest clause of a prior
will, where the subsequent will is not granted probate. On the other
67180 Cal. 629, 182 P. 277 (1919).
61d. at 280.69 157 N.Y.S. 37 (1916).
71 In re Bergland, 180 Cal. 629, 182 P. 277 (1919); In re Mathie's Estate, 64 Cal.
App.2d 767, 149 P.2d 485 (1944).
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hand, if the subsequent will is known to be spurious or the beneficiary
offering it should have known the same, the offering of the subse-
quent will seeking to revoke the prior will constitutes a contest of
the former will and makes the forfeiture clause applicable.
USE OF DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PROCEDURE
In view of the uncertainties as to whether the proposed action will
be considered a "contest" of the will or trust instrument and also as
to whether good faith and probable cause for contesting exist or will
avoid a forfeiture, the beneficiary is often in a dilemma as to what
action, if any, to take. In these circumstances recourse has been had
to the bringing of a suit to construe the will and for a declaratory
judgment as to the effect of the proposed action, in light of the no-
contest provision. This type of action was brought in the case of
Bethurum v. Browder.71 The beneficiary sought to have the court
construe the will and enter a declaratory judgment as to the effect
of the devisee's seeking an action to have certain property partitioned
in kind. The will specified that a devisee refusing to abide by the
decisions of the independent executor would forfeit the bequest. The
court held that under the terms of the statute providing for declara-
tory relief, the court had the power and duty to render judgment de-
claring the rights of the plaintiffs, in light of the no-contest clause,
and the duties and powers of the executor.
The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act" provides that an action
may be brought by any person interested as or through an executor,
trustee, devisee, heir, etc. who may have a declaration of rights or
other legal regulations, to determine any question arising in the ad-
ministration of an estate or trust, including any questions of con-
struction of wills and other writings (section 4); and to direct
executors, administrators to do or refrain from doing any particular
act in their fiduciary capacity.
In Cohen v. Reisman"s a declaratory judgment action was brought
to determine whether a beneficiary would violate the in terrorem
clause by bringing an action seeking to show that the executor had
wrongfully withheld from her certain assets going to her under the
will. The requested relief was granted, the court stating:
Here is an unquestionable justiciable controversy where there is un-
certainty and insecurity with respect to rights of the litigant as to
whether she would forfeit her rights under the will by bringing an
71 216 S.W.2d 992 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.
"'Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 2524-1 (1965).
7348 S.E.2d 113 (Ga. 1948).
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action of the character indicated. It follows from what has been said
that the instant case comes clearly within the purview of the declara-
tory judgment act, and the trial court properly overruled the general
demurrer attacking the petition on this ground.74
DRAFTING OF No-CONTEST PROVISION
Since the forfeiture provision is to be construed strictly, it is im-
portant that the no-contest clause be drafted carefully to cover the
conditions and contingencies intended by the testator or grantor.
No particular form or language is necessary; any language by which
testator makes his intentions clear is adequate. "Anyone breaking this
will is debarred from same, with the payment of $5.00" was held
good against contest."
The no-contest provision may cover only a direct attack or con-
test of the probate of the will or the enforcement of the trust. If,
however, the testator or grantor intends that the condition should be
more comprehensive, language should be used to express adequately
and fully such intention. The following suggest some of the points
that the testator or grantor may desire either to include or exclude
from the statement of the no-contest provision:
1. Direct or indirect contest of the probate of the will or the en-
forcement of the trust instrument, or any part thereof.
2. An objection or opposition to the carrying into effect of any
separate part, provision or declaration contained in the will or trust
agreement.
" id. at 114. To the same effect is Dravo v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 267
S.W.2d 95 (Ky. Civ. App. 1954).
In Boswell v. Hadley, 397 S.W.2d 213 (1965), beneficiaries of certain testamentary
trusts sued the co-trustees and others, seeking to have the will construed and a declaratory
judgment entered in answer to these questions:
1. Would an action in good faith to surcharge the former independent executors for
breaches of trust, collusion, negligence in administration of the estate, etc. constitute a
contest of the will under the no-contest provision?
2. Would an action in good faith to remove the co-trustees for wrongful acts constitute
such contest?
3. Would an action seeking a construction of the administrative or other provisions of
the will constitute a contest?
The plaintiffs expressly disclaimed any intention to contest the validity of the will.
The no-contest provision was comprehensive and covered the contest of the probate or
question of any part of the will or any aid in any manner of a contest. The Tyler Court
of Civil Appeals reversed and remanded the cause because no sworn or certified copy of
the will was attached to the petition. Hadley v. Boswell, 386 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965).
The supreme court likewise decided the case on this procedural ground and thus never
considered whether the use of a suit for construction and for declaratory judgment affords
an appropriate proceeding to secure a prior determination of whether a party can safely
proceed against the independent executors and trustees without thereby bringing a contest.
Neither did it determine whether an action brought in good faith and with probable cause
presents a case of contest violating the no-contest provision. So for the time being these
questions remain unanswered.
7SAndrew's Ex'x v. Spruill, 271 Ky. 516, 112 S.W.2d 402 (1937).
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3. Such indirect opposition to the will or trust instrument as giving
aid or assistance to others who contest.
4. The use of any means of defeating testator's intention or thwart-
ing his will.
5. The expression of dissatisfaction by the legatees or beneficiaries
in the provisions of the will, and requiring them to "acquiesce" in the
provisions of the instrument.
6. Requiring the legatees or beneficiaries to oppose or join in seek-
ing to defeat any contest or opposition to the will or trust instrument.
7. Requiring that the beneficiary who contests or opposes the will
or trust instrument be required to pay the expenses of litigation, the
cost of administration incurred thereby, and other costs."M
Various contingencies that arise in drafting a no-contest provision
are illustrated by this example. The client states that he wants his
will "fixed so that it can't be broken"; that he "doesn't want any
fuss, litigation, fighting or contest of any kind over my estate";
that he does not want his "executor to have any trouble, argument,
or controversy with anybody"; and that "if anybody tries to break
my will, or interfere with my executor in settling my estate, I want
to cut him off without a cent." Presented with a request like this,
the draftsman proceeds to prepare the strongest possible no-contest
clause. The following provision might be prepared:
ARTICLE
I earnestly ask my beneficiaries, devisees and legatees, in harmony
and in all things, to aid my executor in carrying out my wishes
as expressed in this Will. In order to insure this, it is my will, and
I herenow expressly provide, and make it a condition precedent to
the taking, vesting, receiving or enjoying of any property, benefit
or thing whatsoever under and by virtue of this will, that the
beneficiary, devisee and legatee shall accept and agree to all of the
provisions of this will, and the provisions of this Article are made
an essential part of each and every benefit in and under said Will.
If any beneficiary, devisee or legatee hereunder, directly or in-
directly, individually or with another, shall contest the probate or
validity of this Will, or any provision thereof; or shall institute
or join in (except as a party defendant) any proceeding to contest
the validity of this Will or to prevent any provision hereof from
being carried out in accordance with its terms; or shall fail to
acquiesce therein, or shall fail or refuse to defend this Will or any
"6 Guaranty Trust Company v. Blume, 92 N.J. Eq. 538, 114 A. 423 (1921).
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provision herein; or shall in any manner question or dispute any
statement or declaration herein; or shall in any manner aid, assist
or encourage another in any such contest or questioning; or con-
tests, questions or opposes in any legal proceeding the performance
by the executor of any duty, act or discretion granted to or in-
cumbent upon him under the terms of this Will or by law: then
in any such contingency all benefits provided for such beneficiary,
devisee or legatee are revoked and such benefits shall pass to the
residuary beneficiaries of this Will (other than such beneficiary)
in the proportion that the share of each such residuary beneficiary
bears to the aggregate of the effective shares of the residuary. If
all of the residuary beneficiaries join in such contest or proceeding,
or engage in the prohibited act or acts, then such benefits shall pass
to those persons (other than the persons joining in such contest)
who are living at my death and who would have been my dis-
tributees had I died intestate a resident of the State of
and had the person or persons contesting my Will died immediately
before me. If all beneficiaries herein and all heirs at law so act to
incur the penalty of forfeiture, I give such benefits and properties
to A (preferably a charitable institution). Anyone violating in
any manner this provision shall pay all costs and expenses of litiga-
tion, administration and other costs, including attorney's fees. It is
my express intention and desire that in the event of the violation
of the provisions of this Article in any respect, the respective bene-
fits shall be revoked and forfeited regardless of whether or not the
beneficiary, devisee or legatee violating the same instituted the
proceedings, performed the particular act of violation, or failed to
act as herein required in good faith and with probable cause.
It is not suggested that the courts have or would necessarily en-
force each and all of the provisions mentioned in the above no-contest
provision. But, in any event, it should not be difficult for the courts
to understand therefrom the intention of the testator. If, nonetheless,
the court concluded not to decree forfeiture, resort would probably
have to be made to public policy or some similar line of reasoning.
CONCLUSION
The no-contest clause should not be inserted in wills promiscuously
or as a matter of form. With a proper understanding of the testator's
or grantor's situation, the existence of causes that might give rise to
family differences, the natural objects of his bounty, the intended
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recipients of his estate and other related facts the draftsman should
be able to determine the need and desirability of using a no-contest
provision. If the situation calls for the use of such provision, the
extent and scope of the testator's intention in regard thereto should
be ascertained and then implemented accordingly.
It is suggested that the responsibility of the draftsman does not
extend merely to include or not include a no-contest provision. He
should consider and explore with the client the desirability and
propriety of making the will or trust in a manner that will be fair,
reasonable and adequate, consistent with the latter's considered wishes
and desires, but also fair and reasonable to the beneficiaries. Where
a will contains unnatural, arbitrary and unfair provisions under the
circumstances, litigation and controversy will often ensue regardless
of the provision as to contest.
Where the party has real fear or apprehension as to contest by a
particular beneficiary, it is important that the bequest in the will be
of an amount that will place the risk of choice upon the beneficiary.
Where the bequest is of a nominal amount or value, the no-contest
clause will not be a real deterrent to contest, since the beneficiary
will have little to lose by contesting. It is desirable that the bequest
be of sufficient amount or value so that the risk of forfeiture, in the
event of failure, will present a real deterrent.
Summarizing, the no-contest clause has been held valid and not
against public policy, at least where there is a gift over in the event
of breach. Where there is no gift over upon breach, the English courts
hold that the condition is valid as to devises of land but not as to
personalty. Although some courts in the United States follow the
English rule, most jurisdictions uphold the validity of the condition,
whether there is a gift over or not, and whether the property is
realty or personalty.
The courts are divided as to whether forfeiture will be enforced
where the contest was instituted in good faith and with probable
cause, with each side claiming to have "the weight of authority." In
many jurisdictions this exact question has not been specifically
decided.
It is often difficult to determine whether the particular action or
proceeding constitutes a "contest," or violation of the provision in
the instrument. Where the beneficiary is not certain as to what action,
if any, he may safely take, recourse may possibly first be had to a
suit to construe or for declaratory judgment to determine the effect
of the contemplated action.
[Vol. 19:722
1965] NO-CONTEST OR IN TERROREM CLAUSES 739
In the final analysis the no-contest clause should be sparingly used
and carefully phrased to cover the particular situation and circum-
stances of the testator or grantor and should be limited to his con-
sidered intentions. Litigation may often be avoided by drawing
instruments in the light of fair, reasonable and equitable principles
rather than with arbitrary, punitive and capricious designs.
